CANCELLED UTILITY PLANT AND TRADITIONAL
RATEMAKING THEORIES: ARE EITHER USED AND

USEFUL?

Within recent years, investor-owned utilities have cancelled uncompleted generationplants with increasingfrequency. The size of
some cancellationlosses are in the billions of dollars. Regulatory
agencies have attempted to apply traditionalratemaking theories
to allocate the losses between ratepayers and shareholders. This
Comment analyzes regulatory decisions on cancelled utility plants

and provides recommendationsfor improving the application of
traditionalratemaking theories.
INTRODUCTION

Ratepayers, utilities, and regulatory agencies have become in-

creasingly sensitive to the dilemma posed by cancellation of uncompleted electric generating projects. Plant cancellation losses are re-

coverable from only two groups: local ratepayers and utility
shareholders. Regulatory agencies have had the unenviable task of
allocating the loss between these groups, both of which are limited in
their size and their ability to bear the significant burden of the loss.,

These agencies have faced the challenge by employing varied and
unpredictable ratemaking theories.
The largest plant cancellations are only now occurring. Consumer
I. See, e.g., Wald, Adding Power but no Plants, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1984, § D,
at 2, col. I (characterizing rate increases presented by potential plant cancellations as
"hyper-rate shock").
2. See, e.g., Hiltzik & Rosenblatt, Who Will Pay the Cost of Nuclear Bankruptcies?, L.A. Times, May 13, 1984, § V, at 1, col. 1 (The authors discuss potential
cancellations. Among other periled projects, the authors comment on the multi-billion
dollar Seabrook project which poses the possibility of the first major utility bankruptcy.
The utility, Public Service of New Hampshire, has a 35% share in the project, which is
estimated to equal 160% of the Company's net worth). In addition to the increase in the
size of individual cancelled plant losses, their frequency is also rising. For example, the
author's research found that in 1980 and 1981 there were about 8-10 cancelled plant
orders annually. In contrast, there were at least 22 cancelled plant orders in each of 1982
and 1983.
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Power Company's recent cancellation of its Midland project is a
prime example of the immensity of the problem.3 Regulators are
torn between persuasive ratepayer 4 and utility5 arguments that support a shift of any loss from one side to the other. Ratepayers consider themselves innocent bystanders being forced to bear the consequences of a utility's blunder.6 Utilities argue that they are only
attempting to fulfill their responsibility to serve their customers' future energy needs and that the loss should be recoverable from the
ratepayers.7 Between those opposing policy considerations stand the

legal and regulatory theories underlying the ratemaking process. The
critical question is how regulators can apply these theories in ex-

traordinary circumstances and still maintain the integrity of the
process.

This Comment will review and analyze regulatory proceedings
dealing with a utility's prudently 8 incurred expenditures on a plant
that was cancelled prior to entering commercial operation, that is, a
plant that was never "used and useful." Unlike the bulk of existing
literature on the subject, which deals primarily with pre-1982 decisions, 10 the Comment covers only the most recent regulatory deci-

sions on cancelled plant losses.
The Comment will provide some background on the investorowned electric utility industry and its regulatory aspects, followed by
a summary of the ratemaking process. Additionally, an energy perspective of the 1960's and 1970's will provide a glimpse of the oper3. See Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1984, at 2, col. 2 (utility requesting seven billion
dollars in rate relief for cancelled plant).
4. The terms "ratepayer," "customer," and "consumer" will be used interchangeably to mean those parties paying rates for the electricity provided by the utility.
5. The term "utility" refers to those utilities that are investor-owned corporations. Therefore, losses or gains sustained by the corporation actually accrue to its shareholders or investors.
6. See, e.g., Note, Public Utilities: The Black Fox Nuclear Project Cancellation
Dilemma: Of Judicial Review and Reform of Oklahoma's Administrative Process, 36
OKLA. L. REV. 190, 208-10 (1983). More forcefully stated, ratepayers believe that
"[m]anagement, not the consumers, should be responsible for the consequences of its
follies." Id. at 227.
7. See, e.g., id. at 208-09.
8. "Prudent" or "reasonable" expenses is a utility regulatory term of art. Significantly, only "prudent" expenses may be passed on to the ratepayers, while imprudent

expenses are absorbed by the company shareholders. I A.

PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC

(1969).
9. "Used and useful" is another utility regulatory term of art. Whether items of
utility property are "used and useful" in rendering service to the public is the primary
test in deciding whether the utility may earn a rate of return on the property. Id. at 17477.
10. See, e.g., Sommers, Recovery of Electric Utility Losses from Abandoned
Construction Projects, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 363 (1982); Wilson, Ratemaking
Treatment of Abandoned Generating Plant Losses, 8 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 343
(1982); Note, Consumer's Counsel v. Public Utilities Commission: Who Shall Bear the
Cost of Abandonment, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 91 (1981).
UTILITY REGULATION 47-51
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ating forces that contributed to the rash of cancelled plants. The
Comment will conclude by analyzing regulatory agency decisions
and integrating them into recommendations, with contrasting good
and bad examples of agency ratemaking.
UTILITY INDUSTRY BACKGROUND

The utility industry is diverse in the nature and scope of its operations,11 the size of the entities that operate within it, and its ownership features. 12 The Comment addresses only the investor-owned
electric utility companies (hereinafter "public utility" or "utility").
Public utility operations are highly capital intensive.' 3 Because the
cost of utility operations is so high, efficiency is better served by concentrating a single utility's services within a governmentally assigned
service territory.' 4 In this way, one utility's large fixed costs' 5 are
spread over a specified customer base, resulting in a lower average
expense per unit of output than if two companies were to compete in
the same geographic service territory. For this reason, public utilities
are frequently referred to as "natural" monopolies created by market forces.' 6 Nevertheless, some observers criticize unquestioning7 acceptance of the naturalness of a utility's capital requirements.'
The structure of the electric public utility industry is a significant
factor in considering the cancelled plant issue. There are approximately 2700 utility systems that are not privately owned. 8 Never1i. See, e.g., Appendix, Characteristicsof the Public Utility Regulatory Agencies in the United States, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 1157 (1976) (illustrating the types of
utility industries regulated by the various commissions).
12. For example, a utility may be an investor-owned company, a municipal
agency, a cooperative, a federal agency, a state or county authority, or a separate utility
district.
13.

See, e.g., L.S. HYMAN, AMERICA'S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST, PRESENT, AND

199 (1983) (a utility generally requires three or four dollars of plant to produce
only one dollar of revenue).
14. Generally, state laws or regulations specify geographical service boundaries.
Often, such laws bar the granting of multiple franchises where the area is already being
served. Service authority is normally obtained by award of a certificate of convenience
and necessity from the appropriate state agency. See THE U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, THE
FUTURE

at ii (1981).
15. These fixed costs are generally associated with the construction and maintenance of large central power stations and the electrical distribution system. See, e.g.,
Urban, Allocating the Costs of Failed or Abandoned Projects of Regulated Public UtiliNEED FOR POWER AND THE CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGIES

ties,

PUB. UTIL FORT.,

May 24, 1984, at 34.

16. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (the
Court decided that a public utility's conduct vis-a-vis a customer was not "state action"
because the market created a utility's monopoly status, not the state).
17. L.S. HYMAN, supra note 13, at 200.
18. J. TOMAIN, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 215 (1981). See also supra note 12

theless, the investor-owned utilities play the dominant role in electric
power generation in the United States, accounting for approximately
seventy-seven percent of the total generating capacity.

9

Therefore,

U.S. investor-owned utilities play a critical role in this country's
economy. The authority and obligations of the utility within its service territory, and the potential for monopolistic pricing, are sufficient threats
to warrant governmental regulation of investor-owned
20
utilities.
Regulation
Public utility regulation theoretically achieves for society both the
benefits of competition and the relative efficiency of a monopoly. The
regulatory agency is responsible for assuring reliable service for the
customer, fairly apportioning service costs among the customer
groups, and setting utility revenues that provide a reasonable opportunity for a fair return on investment. 2 Regulatory agencies are also
incorporating other social responsibilities into the regulatory process. 22 Additionally, controversial issues have stimulated public participation in regulatory proceedings.2 a Whether the regulators have
misconstrued their function is subject to debate.24
for a listing of non-private utility ownership forms.
19. J. TOMAIN, supra note 18, at 215. Additionally, the role of investor-owned
utilities (IOU's) has shown steady growth in relation to non-investor utilities. In 1965,
IOU's accounted for about 69% of available electricity. In 1981, IOU's accounted for
75%. See L.S. HYMAN, supra note 13, Table 14-2, at 102. Significantly, the 35 largest
investor-owned utilities account for over 60% of the total IOU generating capacity, and
the top 100 account for about 95% of the IOU capacity. See Joskow, Mixing Regulatory
and Antitrust Policies in the Electric Power Industry: The Price Squeeze and Retail
Market Competition, MIT Energy Laboratory Working Paper, MIT-EL 83-023WP,
Oct. 1983, at 5.
20. See Urban, supra note 15, at 34.
21. See L.S. HYMAN, supra note 13, at 133.
22. "The final set of regulatory goals - minimum service reliability, honesty and
fair dealing, informed choice and full disclosure of relevant information, and health,
safety, and environmental protection - are more recent in origin and do not require full
scale intervention in the business." E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, REGULATED INDUSTRIES
IN A NUTSHELL 12 (1982).
23. For example, members of the San Diego community recently created the
Utility Consumer Action Network (UCAN). UCAN intends to represent ratepayer interests on important issues before the California Public Utility Commission, while working cooperatively with the local utility to solve common problems (as reported by the
statements of the UCAN Interim Board of Directors in its September, 1983 mailer enclosed in the San Diego Gas & Electric customer billings).
24. There is a fashionable notion that the Commission can, in the public interest, simply deny requests for rate increases. The proper Commission role is
perceived to be to battle against inflation, an economic condition which neither
the companies nor the Commission can control, not merely to temper the potential abuses of unbridled monopoly power. In this "competing interests" view of
rate regulation, the lower the rates and rate increases allowed by the Commission, the more "just and reasonable" they are thought to be. But this perception
is simply wrong. As elementary as it will seem to most readers, it must be ob-
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Public utility regulation is separated into two basic jurisdictional
areas: federal and state. Primary regulation is accomplished through

state-created agencies,2 5 because most of the investor-owned utility

business is performed at the "retail" level. 26 Typically, state commissions are granted authority through legislative or constitutional provisions. 27 However, despite the similarities in their creation and basic
ratemaking powers, the state
commissions vary considerably in the
28
extent of their jurisdiction.
Regulation of electric utilities by the federal government is relatively recent vis-a-vis state regulation, but it is expanding steadily.2"
Initially, federal regulation was accomplished through the Federal
Power Commission, 0 but this task has since been assumed by the
Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC).31 The FERC exercises "wholesale" jurisdiction over sales of electricity intended for

subsequent resale to end users.32 This jurisdiction over interstate
commerce involves two basic types of transactions: (1) coordination
sales, where one utility sells electricity to another based on temporary differences in cost or supply between them,33 and (2) requireserved that the provision of "safe and adequate service" carries a market-determined price tag, and the level of "just and reasonable rates" is the level which
exactly pays that price.
New York P.S.C. No. C27679 (ALJ Harrison, 1982).
25. Both federal and state authorities may exercise jurisdiction simultaneously
over the utility. Although the volume of wholesale transactions subject to federal jurisdiction have been increasing, an IOU's financial performance "depends primarily on
state regulation since the bulk of a typical IOU's operating costs, capital facilities and
revenues are associated with serving its retail customers." Joskow, supra note 19, at 11.
State regulatory agency titles include: public utility commission, public service commission, state corporation commission, and department of public utilities. See, e.g., Appendix, supra note 11, at 1157 (providing a list of commission titles). Hereinafter, these
agencies will be referred to as "commissions."
26. Retail transactions refer to the sale of electricity to the direct consumer, e.g.,
a household or a business.
27. See Appendix, supra note 11, at 1157.
28. See W.T. GORMLEY, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 10-11
(1983). Fundamentally, however, "public utility commissions have substantial control
over rates, supply, and demand." Id. at 11.
29. See J. TOMAIN, supra note 18, at 216-20 (providing a summary of federal
regulatory development).
30. Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7171 (1980). The Federal Power Commission was dissolved at
the inception of the FERC. See Opinion No. 1, 1 FED. ENERGY REG. COMM. (CCH)
61,001 (1977).
32. Regulations Preamble, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM. (CCH) 1 30,455, at 30,496
(June 1, 1983).
33. Id. These sales account for approximately two-thirds of electricity bought or
sold under the FERC's jurisdiction.

ments sales by which electric utilities regularly purchase part or all
of their electricity from other utilities for distribution to their customers.3 4 Despite its limited jurisdiction, the FERC does provide
persuasive authority for state commissions and, in some circumstances, even dictates a course of action for a state commission."

Limitations on governmental regulation of public utilities exist but
they are quite flexible. A 'state may delegate power to its commission

within the confines of its police power.3 Generally, state violations of
these limits are alleged as governmental takings of private property
for a public use without just compensation."7 The FERC is limited to
those powers granted by federal legislation3" and constitutionally
permissible. Within their limitations, the state and federal regulatory
commissions employ various methods to accomplish their goals.
However, the most common and influential method is "cost-of-service" ratemaking by which the level of utility revenues is regulated. 39
Ratemaking
A familiarity with basic ratemaking concepts is required in order
to understand the regulatory treatment of cancelled plants. Essentially, the ratemaking process employs subjective standards to arrive
at quantitative results.40 The conceptual theories underpinning the
process are dynamic and subject to broad interpretation. Theoretically, the ratemaking process should replicate for a utility the market forces that act on unregulated private businesses. Regulatory

goals are effectively communicated to a utility by manipulating its
level of authorized revenues, while still balancing the interests and
rights of the ratepayers and investors.41 The level of revenues, or
34. Id. Although only a relatively small amount of IOU revenues are achieved
through requirements sales, any changes in wholesale rates greatly affect municipal and
cooperative utilities that lack adequate, or any, generating capacity. This direct relationship may explain the reason that municipalities do not want another utility's construction
costs included in wholesale rates before the plant is operational.
35. For example, if the FERC allows wholesale cost recovery in rates between
utilities under a requirements contract, the state commission may not disallow the recovery of those costs by the buying utility. Under the supremacy clause of the Constitution,
federal authority overrides the state's denial. See Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen,
314 N.W.2d 32 (N.D. 1981).
36. In discussing the limits of state police power, the U.S. Supreme Court has
stated, "[w]e deal ... with what traditionally has been known as the police power. An
attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on
its own facts." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
37. See E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra note 22, at 103-09.
38. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7171-77 (1982).
39. See E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra note 22, at 12-13.
40. See, e.g., A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1969); J.
BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961) (both are classic texts on rate
regulation). See also J. TOMAIN, supra note 18; E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra note
22 (both are less technical, and easily understood references).
41. See J. TOMAIN, supra note 18, at 106.
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rates, is determined by the commission in a public proceeding, generally called a "rate case."' 42 It involves an analysis of three basic elements: rate base, rate of return, and allowable expenses.4 3
The first step in setting rates is determining the "rate base,"
which represents the utility's investment in, or fair value of, assets
employed in providing service. 4 Because it generally earns a return

only on that property included in the rate base, the utility has a
strong incentive to maximize the size of its rate base, although there
are reasonable limits. The four major issues arising in the determination of the rate base45 are the selection of (1) the method of valuation, (2) which assets are used and useful,46 (3) the treatment of
property intended for future use,47 and (4) the type of depreciation
for the rate base assets.4 8 Although commissions have used a variety
42. The "rate case" is not always the only process by which a utility can request
rate adjustment. In California, for example, there are interim proceedings to bring major
facilities into the rate base (Major Additions Adjustment Clause), and adjust for price
changes in natural gas (Consolidated Adjustment Mechanism) and fuels used in electric
generation facilities (Energy Cost Adjustment Clause). See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec.,
California PUC Decision No. 83-09-007 (Sept. 7, 1983) (the PUC's first formal adoption
of a Major Additions Adjustment proceeding).
43. See 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 8, at 45.
44. 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 8, at 139.
45. See generally E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra note 22, at 110-30.
46. The commonly accepted "used and useful" test is applied to an asset to determine whether it is properly included in the rate base. Additionally, the "prudence" of a
utility's investment in an asset is studied. Typically, imprudently incurred costs are not
recoverable in rates. See E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra note 22, at 115-21. See also
1 A. PRIEST, supra note 8, at 174-77. Commissions apply the "used and useful" standard
either as a matter of policy, or because of statutory requirements. The supporting rationale is that a ratepayer should not pay for a facility that is not providing a benefit. This
test offers a substantial obstacle to a utility attempting to obtain a return on its investment in a cancelled generating plant, because such a facility was never "used and useful"
to the ratepayer. This circumstance and variations in the application of the test by commissions is addressed later in this Comment.
47. Utilities engaging in construction of facilities for future use accrue costs in
Construction Work in Progress (CWIP) accounts. The used and useful test usually precludes these costs from being placed in the rate base until the facility is commercially
operational. Many jurisdictions accommodate the present value of money problems associated with CWIP held for long periods by providing an Allowance for Funds Used During Construction (AFUDC). Essentially, AFUDC is a setoff to the utility's cost of money
held in its CWIP account. See 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 8, at 177-80. High construction
costs, cash flow problems, the fluctuating cost of money (interest rates), and "rate shock"
as large assets enter the rate base at the time of commercial operation are influencing
commission attitudes about the effectiveness of the CWIP/AFUDC methodology. See E.
GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra note 22, at 121-26. An excellent discussion of the entire
controversy surrounding CWIP inclusion in the rate base has been provided by the
FERC. See Regulations Preamble, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM. (CCH) 1 30,455 (June 1,
1983).
48. A utility's rate base is depreciated to account for the "consumption" of its

of approaches to value the rate base, the U.S. Supreme Court has
rejected any specific49mechanical approach and inquires whether the
"end result" is fair.
The second step in setting the level of rates is determining the
authorized rate of return.50 The primary considerations in setting a
rate of return are fairness to both investors and consumers and recognition of the utility's need to attract capital. The utility is not
guaranteed a return; it is "given an opportunity

. . .

to earn a re-

turn."51 Methods of determining the authorized rate of return vary
among the jurisdictions. Although some commissions follow statutorily mandated approaches, others concentrate on setting revenue
levels that permit the utility to provide adequate, efficient service at

reasonable rates. Irrespective of the method selected, the commissions' decisions "must be measured as much by the success with
which they protect those [public] interests as by the effectiveness
with which they 'maintain credit and

. . .

attract capital.' 52

The last step in setting the level of rates is determining operating
expenses. Expenses include wages, salaries, supplies, maintenance,

and research and development costs. However, not all expenses are
"allowable" for the purposes of determining rates.5 3 The commissions usually evaluate whether the expenses were "prudent."54
Thereafter, the commission may set the allowable revenues by adassets over time. The depreciation amount is withdrawn from the rate base so that a
return is no longer earned on the "exhausted" portion of the asset and is added as a
current year expense to be recovered in rates. When fully depreciated and expensed, the
asset no longer provides a return for the utility. See E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra
note 22, at 126-30.
49. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 951 (1944). See
E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra note 22, at 103-9 (discussing Hope and other Supreme Court decisions in the ratemaking area).
50. The rate of return is "[t]he percentage by which a utility's rate base is multiplied to determine the wages of capital." I A. PRIEST, supra note 8, at 191. Therefore, a
change in the rate of return on a given rate base will result in greater or lesser "authorized" net income for the utility. See generally E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra note
22, at 130-41.
51. 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 8, at 191.
52. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 791 (1968). As stated by A.
J.Priest, "[w]orkers who are not adequately compensated will take a walk; so will investors." 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 8, at 191.
53. Commissions may disallow expenses where (1) the outlays were imprudent,
(2) management discretion was abused, (3) the action taken was against the public interest, (4) there was economic waste, or (5) the expenditures exceeded the reasonable
charge. I A. PRIEST, supra note 8, at 51.
54. A series of analytical steps should be taken to review the prudence or reasonableness of a management decision: (1)the good faith of the managers is presumed (West
Ohio Gas Co. v. Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935)); (2) the decisions
must be reviewed based on facts known at the time and not on hindsight (Wisconsin Tel.
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 232 Wis. 274, 287 N.W. 122, 167 (1939), cert. denied, 309
U.S. 657 (1940)); and (3) the commission should not substitute its judgment for that of
the management (294 U.S. at 72).
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ding the net income 55 to the allowable expenses.5 6 Those allowable
revenues are then translated into rates charged to customers.
The second phase of the basic ratemaking process is rate design,
which involves scheduling rates for different customer groups.5 7 Although rate design is important to individual customer groups, more
regulatory and public attention is concentrated on the setting of a
rate level.
In summary, the ratemaking process serves a variety of public and
utility interests. Although these interests have been served effectively
for many years, numerous factors5" are causing observers to question
many of the methodologies employed.5 9 Increasingly, plant cancellations are one of the forces in this trend.
ENERGY PERSPECTIVE

It is difficult to appreciate the cancelled plant dilemma without a
glimpse of the recent past of the electric utility industry. Through
1970, U.S. consumption of electricity grew at a rapid rate. 0 In
1970, consumption estimates indicated a four-fold demand increase
by 1990.16 Recognizing their obligation to serve the customer,6 2 utili55. The authorized net income is determined by multiplying the "rate base" by
the authorized "rate of return."
56. For example, assume a utility has a rate base of $1,000,000, a 10% rate of
return, and expenses of $1,000,000. The authorized net income would be 10% (rate of
return) of $1,000,000 (rate base), or $100,000. The rate level would then be set to gain
revenues to recoup $1,100,000 (expenses plus net income). Although it may realize its
authorized revenues, the utility will miss its net income target if actual expenses exceed
those projected in the rate case. The result of higher-than-expected expenses is an actual
rate of return lower than the utility's authorized rate of return.
57. See, e.g., J. TOMAIN, supra note 18, at 115-21 (generally discussing rate
design).
58. One industry consultant considers the three most important factors to be (1)
inflation, (2) the fact that unit production cost of electricity is not decreasing with technological advances as in previous years, and (3) a national energy situation that has
created instability in the economy and has had a disproportionate impact on utilities. See

Swartwout, Some Plain Talk About Reform of Ratemaking, PUB.

UTIL. FORT.,

Feb. 16,

1984, at 17.
59. See, e.g., id. at 15-19. See also Stauffer & Navarro, A Critique of Conventional Utility Rate-Making Methodologies, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 26, 1981, at 25 (a
general critique of the ratemaking process).
60. Between 1920 and 1970 electricity consumption doubled about every ten
years. In comparison to a total energy consumption increase of about three and one-half
times during the same period, electricity consumption in the U.S. increased about
twenty-nine times. See REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, ELECTRICITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 18 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ELECTRICITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT].

61. Id.
62. Representative of the utility mood was the following statement by an industry

ties began constructing large electric generating facilities because of
their economic advantages.8 3 Additionally, the nuclear industry be-

gan more fully developing its commercial applications in the 1960's,
and the perceived advantages of nuclear power caused some observers to predict that it would comprise forty-four percent of the nation's generating capacity by 1985.4 The electric industry entered
the 1970's with aggressive construction programs6

needs. 6

5

to meet reasona-

bly predictable electricity
The new decade brought much turmoil for a traditionally stable
industry. The first major shock was the 1973 OPEC oil embargo.67
The result was a quadrupling of the price of oil for a utility industry
increasingly dependent on this energy resource. Besides stimulating a
worldwide recession in 1974-75, the economics of higher fuel and

electricity costs for utilities and customers resulted in fundamental
changes in energy consumption and policy. Demand for electricity
started dropping.68 Other factors caused increased utility costs, espelawyer:
Today, all of the electric energy requirements of the nation are being served.
While these requirements are expected to grow by leaps and bounds, the nonfederal segments of the industry which have the utility responsibility to meet
new requirements are in a position and are laying plans to do so.
Address by T.J. Debevoise on the "Legal Aspects of the National Power Survey" before
the A.B.A. Section of Public Utility Law (Aug. 10, 1965). Events disputed Mr.
Debevoise's assertion that all of the nation's electricity requirements were being served.
Three months later in November, 1965, the Northeast Blackout put a dark cloud over
the electric utility industry. One observer characterizes 1965 as the watershed year for
the industry, after which it sank into a sea of problems. See L.S. HYMAN, supra note 13,
at 100-15.
63. Utility generating plants are designed to meet a variety of electrical demands,
including base-load and peak-load requirements. For some of the economic considerations, see L.S. HYMAN, supra note 13, at 35-36. Illustrative of the growth of plant size is
the fact that large plants in the early 1950's were 200 megawatts, while early 1970's
plants were 1000 megawatts and often sites contained multiple units. Plant size was expected to triple by 1990, while accounting for an increasingly large share of the generating capacity. ELECTRICITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 60, at 24.
64. See 2 A. PRIEST, supra note 8, at 772. In fact, nuclear power only accounted
for roughly 10% of the nation's generating capacity by 1981 and will not meet the more
optimistic 1985 projections. See L.S. HYMAN, supra note 13, Table 31-1, at 275. See also
Olsen, The Washington Public Power Supply System: The Story So Far, PUB, UTIL.
FORT., June 10, 1982, at 15-19 (an informative summary of the inception, development,
and demise of one 1960's nuclear project).
65. At the time, construction cycles for plants were relatively short, about five to
seven years. See, e.g., Luce, Where is the Electric Utility Industry Headed in the
1980's?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 23, 1983, at 15.
66. Projecting future demand was a relatively easy process at the time. Steady
growth curves essentially allowed planners to extrapolate based on past consumption. See
L.S. HYMAN, supra note 13, at 36-39.
67. See generally ENERGY POLICY 13-16 (Congressional Quarterly ed. 1981) (a
summary of the events surrounding the embargo).
68. Until the 1973-74 price increases, annual electricity growth averaged about
seven percent. By the end of the decade, this rate had dropped to three percent or less.
Id. at 14.
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cially construction delays6 9 and the general rate of inflation. The nuclear power industry was then dealt a strong setback with the Three
Mile Island nuclear plant accident. Public and regulatory concerns °
caused nuclear power plant construction costs to increase dramatically, and political support for the nuclear option faded quickly.7 1
Operating rules for electric utilities had changed significantly and
the future was uncertain. 2
The events of the 1970's left the industry in a vulnerable position
as it entered the 1980's. Consumers had experienced significant rate
hikes.7 3 As a result, electric sales continued to decline,7 4 with a corresponding drop in utility revenues and a deterioration of utility financial positions.7 5 Simultaneously, plant construction costs continued to escalate. 6 In this environment of lower-than-expected
demand, lower net incomes, rising construction expenditures, and increased financial uncertainty and risk, many utilities selected the
only "prudent" alternative: cancel the construction of their new elec-

69. Early delays were generally attributable to labor problems and equipment
failures. However, regulatory delays caused by environmental and other concerns were
expected to rise. See

ELECTRICITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT,

supra note 60, at 22-23.

70. These concerns included radioactive disposal, plant safety features, licensing
procedures, public safety, and allocation of nuclear accident and plant decommissioning
costs. ENERGY POLICY, supra note 67, at 80.
71. Compare President Nixon's enthusiasm for nuclear power with President
Carter's. "Nuclear power ... is an essential part of our program of achieving energy
self-sufficiency .... I have directed that steps be taken to reduce the licensing and
construction cycle to 5-6 years, without compromising safety and environmental standards." Address of President Nixon on Jan. 23, 1974, reprinted in ENERGY POLICY,
supra note 67, at 245-46. In contrast, President Carter stated that the Three Mile Island
Accident "demonstrated dramatically that we have other energy problems" besides oil
prices. Address of President Carter on April 5, 1979, reprinted in id. at 256-58 (The
balance of President Carter's speech referred to nuclear power only in the context of
improved safety measures.).
72. Reflecting on the events of the 1970's, one former utility chairman of the
board wrote that "[a]nyone asked to prophesy where the electric utility industry is
headed in the 1980's must approach the subject with humility." See Luce, supra note 65,
at 15 (the article also provides a useful comparison of basic utility assumptions for the
1970's and what actually happened).
73. A recent study by the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) reported that the average residential customer's bill increased 156%
between 1972 and 1982. The highest increase was in Hawaii where rates increased 340%.
San Diego Union, June 21, 1984, at B-3, col. 5. Other areas still face significant increases as a new plant comes into the rate base. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1984, § 1, part 1,
at 1, col. 3.
74. See L.S. HYMAN, supra note 13, Table 3-1, at 23.
75. See generally id. at 104-15.
76. See, e.g., What Others Think, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 27, 1982, at 47 (a
discussion of the causes of plant cancellations).

tric generating facilities. 77
CANCELLED PLANT ORDERS

Associated Costs

Cancelled plant losses include those costs accrued on the project,
including expenditures for land, labor, materials, taxes, licensing
fees, environmental studies, financing, and other charges. These costs
are normally capitalized in Construction Work in Progress
(CWIP)781 and Allowance for Funds Used During Construction
(AFUDC) accounts.79 The ratemaking treatment of accrued CWIP
and AFUDC charges is generally limited to one of two basic
methods.80
The first method reflects the capitalized AFUDC as non-cash income on the utility's books. Ratepayers do not pay rates on the
AFUDC carrying charge until the plant goes into operation. At that
time all CWIP and AFUDC is recovered through rates by adding
them to the rate base, and depreciating the amounts accordingly.81
The second method for recovering the cost of money accrued in the
CWIP account is to include CWIP in the rate base. Contrary to the
AFUDC approach, the utility presently recovers cash income from

the ratepayers through the rate of return components of its rates.8 2

Theoretically, each method should result in identical cost recovery
for the utility. The main difference is timing - when the customer
will actually begin to pay rates reflecting these construction-related
77. See, e.g., Zitser, The Nuclear Plant Problem Needs a FederalSolution, PUB.
FORT., Mar. 29, 1984, at 22-26 (summary of the current cancelled plant scenario).
78. CWIP is the total amount of the capital expenditures which have accrued to
facilities and equipment not yet in service for the ratepayers. CWIP may include an
element called Allowance for Funds Used During Construction (AFUDC) which accounts for the capitalization of financing costs of the facility. See supra note 47 for
treatment of financing costs where CWIP is not included in the rate base.
79. Essentially, AFUDC is a charge made to capital projects to reflect the cost of
money (capital) invested in the project. The actual "interest cost" is dependent on the
authorized AFUDC percentage rate and the CWIP amount.
80. See Regulations Preamble, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM. (CCH) 1 30,455, at
30,491.
81. An argument for this approach is that rates should not cover "non-used and
useful" facilities. For example, the current ratepayer may move before the plant is operational, or it may be cancelled. Conversely, an argument against the AFUDC approach is
that AFUDC amounts to a bookkeeping entry that does not pay any bills in the interim
period before the plant is operational. Therefore, a utility may have to seek external
financing to solve any cash flow problems. See, e.g., The Energy Daily, Aug. 23, 1984, at
3, col. 2 (95% of the second quarter earnings of Long Island Lighting were represented
by non-cash AFUDC).
82. See Regulations Preamble, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM. (CCH) 1 30,455, at
30,491. This avoids the need to add AFUDC to the CWIP account for recovery when the
plant enters service.
UTIL.
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charges.8 3 Nevertheless, CWIP policy generates strong feelings on
both sides of the issue, 4 and has a significant effect on a 8 commis5
sion's approach toward cost recovery for a cancelled plant.
Regulatory commissions initially engaged the cancelled plant cost

recovery issue armed with8 6the traditional "prudent expense," and
"used and useful" theories.

As the problem developed, new theoret-

ical approaches were formulated. For example, an "equitable sharing" theory allocating the prudent loss between ratepayers and the

utility gained favor.8 7 However, despite newly developed approaches

to allocating the loss, some questions remain basic to resolving the

plant cancellation problem. They include:
1. Were the decisions to commence, and subsequently to cancel, the

facility prudent; 88
2. May the prudently incurred expenses be recovered;8 9

3. If recoverable, over what period of time will the expenses be amortized; 90 and
83. See, e.g., L.S. HYMAN, supra note 13, at 141-43.
84. For a discussion of CWIP policy, see, e.g., Hobelman, Knapp & Walsh, Construction Work in Progress for Electric Utilities: A Compendium of Comments
Presented to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in Docket No. RM81-38, reprinted in ELECTRIC POWER 65 (PLI ed. 1982).
85. For a summary of regulatory treatment of a cancelled plant and how jurisdictional treatment of CWIP bears on the issue, see A Survey of Regulatory Treatment of
Plant Cancellation Costs, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 31. 1983, at 52.
86. Cf. Avery, The Costs of NuclearAccidents and Abandonments in Rate Making, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 8, 1979, at 18-19 (discussion of the analogous problem of
cost recovery for a plant that was "used and useful" before abandonment).
87. See, e.g., Re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 29 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 65,
81 (Va. Mar. 19, 1979) (noting that the plant was never used and useful, the Commission considered that "equity" demanded VEPCO share the risk of loss with the
ratepayers).
88. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
89. Generally, this issue arises where the jurisdiction statutorily precludes the
commission from allowing recovery in rates of a loss from a plant never used and useful.
See, e.g., Comment, A New Approach to Allocating Financial Responsibility for Cancelled Nuclear Units - Consumer's Counsel v. Public Utility Commission of Ohio, 13
U. TOL. L. REV. 1469 (1982) (discussion of statutory preclusion).
90. Amortization involves the gradual extinguishment of a loss or debt. Assume
the circumstances of a $10,000,000 loss on a prudent investment. If the commission were
to allow the entire loss to be written off for ratemaking purposes in one year, i.e., expensed, the allowable utility revenues would increase by $10,000,000 with a corresponding effect on consumer rates. If the commission wants to soften the rate increase, it can
amortize the loss over a number of years. Assuming a ten-year amortization period, the
utility would expense $1,000,000 each year for ten years. The longer the amortization
period, the longer it takes the utility to recover its loss through rates. Depending on the
treatment awarded on the "unamortized" balance, the utility may lose some portion of
the investment because of the time value of money. Additionally, carrying the loss on the
books while awaiting recovery may force the utility to seek external financing to maintain

4. May the utility earn a return, or be awarded a carrying charge, on
the unamortized balance of the expense?91
Other ancillary issues may also arise, such as the proposed treatment of tax deductions and AFUDC components.92 In responding to
these basic questions, commissions have awarded three general
ratemaking treatments of cancelled plant losses. They are "full recovery," "partial recovery," and "no recovery."
Full Recovery
In "full recovery," the commission establishes the prudent costs
associated with the project.93 Subsequently, an amortization period is
selected over which the prudent costs are recovered. Actual cash re-

covery is accomplished by expensing the current year's amortized
amount, which has a corresponding effect of increasing rates.94 The
unamortized balance of the loss, or some portion of that unrecovered
amount, is included in the rate base or is awarded a "carrying
charge." Therefore, although not immediately recovering all prudent
costs, the utility is earning a return on the amount not yet recovered.
Rate base treatment increases rates by enlarging the rate base and,

therefore, the allowable net income. The recoverable balance is gradually reduced by the annually amortized amount until the loss is
completely recovered. "Full recovery" is generally more favorable to
its financial integrity.
91. Utilities want to maintain the value of their money over time and also earn a
return on their investment. After a plant is cancelled, it can no longer accrue AFUDC.
However, the utility may be able to keep CWIP in the rate base if it was originally
allowed. Where the costs have not been put into the rate base, the cessation of AFUDC
accruals and the amortization of the loss will cause the money to lose value over time at
some rate, e.g., the rate of inflation. To ameliorate this gradual lessening in value, a
utility will often request one of two authorizations. First, the utility may request authorization to put the unamortized balance in the rate base. Each year the rate base is decreased by the annual amortization amount, which is expensed. Generally, the major
objection to this alternative is that the plant was never used and useful. Second, if no
rate base treatment is awarded, the utility may request a fixed "carrying charge" to
accrue on the unamortized balance. Arguably, this approach is analogous to rate base
treatment. Opponents often characterize this alternative as providing AFUDC on Construction Work Not in Progress. Therefore, award of either rate base inclusion for the
unamortized balance or of a carrying charge favors the utility's maximum cost recovery.
Conversely, exclusion of any return on the unamortized balance results in relatively lowcr
rates for the ratepayers. Nevertheless, some observers argue that failure to award rate
base treatment actually raises rates over the long run because of the utility's increased
costs of capital.
92. See, e.g., Small, FERC Electric Rate Primer, 5 ENERGY L.J. 107 (1984) (an
analysis of the approach of the FERC to cancelled plants).
93. Prudent costs may be determined in many ways. Generally, a commission
analyzes all expenditures and determines the reasonableness of each expense. A commission may also determine a prudence "cut-off" date, beyond which all expenditures are
imprudent and, therefore, unrecoverable. See, e.g., Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 471 (Mass. Apr. 30, 1982) (finding that the uncertainty at an
earlier date was high enough to warrant cancellation at that time).
94. See supra note 90 for an example.
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the utility, and should increase customer rates to the greatest extent.
However, this approach is 9used
sparingly and can be applied without
5
enhancing utility recovery.
Those jurisdictions that have awarded full recovery justify their
decisions on a variety of theories. For the proposes of clearly explaining the basis for its decision, the New York Public Service Commission's (NYPSC) Re Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.9 opinion provides a good example. After establishing the prudent costs91 of the
Sterling project9" the NYPSC discussed whether the utilities should
be awarded a carrying charge of some percentage on the unamortized balance of the loss. Intervenors, opposing the utilities' request,
argued primarily that the loss should be shared between ratepayers
and shareholders in a manner "reflecting the benefits that each
group would have realized from a completed facility." 99 However,
the argument failed to persuade the NYPSC to depart from its earlier established policy of awarding full recovery. 100 Furthermore, the
NYPSC's criticism that the intervenor's evidence made only a poor
attempt at carrying the burden of proof' 1 gave additional support
95. See, e.g., Re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 29 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 517
(D.C. P.S.C. June 14, 1979). PEPCO decided to build a nuclear facility in 1970, and
terminated the project in June 1977. The cancellation resulted in a jurisdictional loss of
about $66,000,000. However, a sale of nuclear fuel rights resulted in a net gain, which
actually caused a temporary reduction of the rate base by being included therein. The
PSC staff opposed the decision to grant rate base treatment because of its precedential
value, should there be a net loss in the future. The Commission responded that such a
"result does not necessarily follow." Id. at 579. Cf. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., Wis.
P.S.C. Case No. 05-CE-3 (Feb. 14, 1980) ("full recovery" offered as an incentive to
cancel the project immediately).
96. 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 386 (N.Y. Jan. 13, 1982).
97. A significant element in establishing the utilities' prudence was the effect of
the statutory "obligation to serve" on management decisions. See 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) at 391.
98. The Sterling nuclear power project was a joint effort by four utilities. In
1978, the N.Y. Siting Board issued a certification to build the plant. In 1980, the Siting
Board revoked the certification on the grounds that a need had not been established. The
utility participants did not appeal the Siting Board decision, but instead sought full recovery from the NYPSC for net expenses of about $100,000,000. Re Rochester Gas &
Elec. Corp., 41 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 438, 442 (N.Y. Jan. 6, 1981).
99. Id.
100. NYPSC precedent "established a practice of allowing full recovery of all
sunk costs, including carrying charges [analogous to rate base treatment], irrespective of
the relative benefits that may have flowed from the abandoned or uncompleted project."
Id. Compare the dissenting commissioner's view of NYPSC precedent: "As far as I'm
concerned, the issue faced here is of first impression for the commission in that we have
never dealt with an abandonment loss of this magnitude arising from a plant never in
service. I would therefore place less weight on precedent than does the majority. ...
Id. at 411 (Mead, Commissioner, dissenting).
101. Responding to an argument that rigorous analysis of the "potential benefits"

for its full recovery decision. Subsequently, the NYPSC awarded a
carrying charge on the unamortized balance of the loss, which is
analogous to rate base treatment. 10

The NYPSC then analyzed the effect of various amortization peri03
ods on the shareholders and ratepayers of each respective utility.
The NYPSC rejected the staff proposal of a thirty-year amortization,104 considering that ratemaking and accounting principles did
not theoretically support the staff's proposal, that shorter amortization periods were not unreasonably adverse to customer rates, and
that each utility's financial status warranted periods shorter than
that proposed. Subsequently, each utility's circumstances were analyzed individually, and each awarded an amortization period. Although a dissenting commissioner faulted the majority's selection of
certain amortization periods, 05 the evidence supporting his allegation was not substantial enough to find that the majority acted
unreasonably. 06
Another full recovery decision provides a useful contrast to the
07
Rochester proceeding. In Re Boston Edison Company (BECO),'

the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) confronted
BECO's $278,000,000 loss on the cancelled Pilgrim II plant. BECO

requested cost recovery over ten years with a carrying charge on the
unamortized balance' 081 In discussing risk and loss allocations, the
DPU stated that the Pilgrim II project "represents nothing less than
sharing concept was needed, the NYPSC found that the intervenor "did not attempt to
provide it," and that the intervenor's "proposed equal sharing was based on a rough
estimate of the benefits as it saw them." Id.
102. A carrying charge is a percentage return that is provided to the utility on
some assets or costs. Technically, this is not rate base treatment because the expenditures
are not included therein and subject to the utilities' authorized rate of return. Practically,
a carrying charge is analogous to rate base treatment because some return is earned
through rates. The major difference, then, is the established carrying charge percentage.
In Rochester, the staff argued for a carrying charge at the "risk free" rate, e.g., U.S.
Treasury Bonds, or other government securities. The NYPSC rejected this approach and
provided a carrying charge at the utility's "cost of capital" which is more analogous to a
market rate. Id. at 411.
103. See generally id. at 403-10. In selecting the amortization period, three considerations were analyzed: (1) general ratemaking principles, (2) the impact on customer
bills, and (3) the utility's financial integrity.
104. The staff proposal was based on the useful life of an operational facility, i.e.,
30 years.
105. "The determination of amorization periods should take into greater account
the impact such periods will have on the ratepayers . . . ." Id.
106. Under the dissenter's proposal, the monthly costs per customer for the cancelled plant would have dropped about 30 to 60 cents. Id. In comparison to the effect on
the utility's financial situation, this customer impact seems minimal. Whether the
NYPSC follows its precedent in future cases may be severely tested if either of the billion dollar Shoreham or Nine Mile Point nuclear projects is cancelled.
107. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431 (Mass. Apr. 30, 1982), as modified 53
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 349 (Mass. May 31, 1983), affid sub. nom. Attorney Gen. v.
Dep't of Pub. Util., 390 Mass. 208, 455 N.E.2d 414 (1983).
108. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 434.
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the attempt by the Company to address and meet its service obligation to its customers." 10 9 The factors bearing on the loss allocation
were: (1) BECO's prudence, (2) the equity and fairness of any proposed solution, and (3) the financial integrity of the company and its
ability to p:rovide future service. 110
After reviewing the prudence issue, the DPU addressed the "equity and fairness" consideration. Based on precedent, the DPU disallowed "the equity rate of return portion of AFUDC" from the
amount to be amortized."' The DPU then considered the two primary factors in structuring recovery: the carrying charge and the
amortization period. However, unlike the NYPSC in Rochester, the
DPU provided little justification for its decisions. After only one paragraph discussing risk-sharing between shareholders and consumers,

the DPU authorized BECO a fourteen percent carrying charge on
the unamortized balance.

12

Additionally, the DPU's subsequent dis-

cussion of the amortization period was limited to only two
paragraphs. After deciding that the amortization of the loss should

not be tied to the projected life of the cancelled plant, the DPU
con3
cluded that a thirteen-year amortization was appropriate."

Irrespective of the Rochester and Boston Edison decisions,"" com109. Id. at 456. A similar observation was made by the ALJ in Rochester about
the utility's statutory obligation to serve. 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 389.
110. Id. at 461.
111. Id. at 471. Essentially, the DPU considered that this action placed some of
the risk on the common stockholder. The debt (e.g., bonds, etc.) and preferred equity
portion of AFUDC was allowed to be included in the recoverable amount.
112. The carrying charge was reviewable and adjustable to any reasonable rate.
Id. at 472. In fact, the rate was dropped to 9.3% a year later. Re Boston Edison Co., 53
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 349 (Mass. May 31, 1983). The justification that this return
would support an energy resource plan is a weak counter to the "used and useful" standard. However, the DPU had stated earlier in its decision that "the standard [used and
useful] does not, however, determine the recovery question." 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) at 435.
113. Allegedly, BECO's proposed ten-year amortization "would result in a disproportionately large impact on customers." Id. at 473. Unfortunately, the DPU did not
provide any quantitative data to support its finding, but based its opinion on "evidence in
the record." Id. In some respects, the DPU's reference to the record is not unusual in
that the transcripts could run thousands of pages on the subject of amortization periods.
Nevertheless, other commissions have been less vague by expressing their quantitative
basis more clearly. Cf. Re Rochester Gas & Elec., 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 386
(N.Y. Jan. 13, 1982) (excellent quantitative analysis of various treatment alternatives).
114. The Boston Edison and Rochester cases provide a sharp contrast of how thoroughly commissions express their decisionmaking rationale. The NYPSC majority devoted a significantly greater portion of its opinion to analyzing the carrying charge and
amortization period than the DPU. What possible explanations are there? First, the
DPU's perspective of how cost recovery affects the utility and the consumer is a significant factor. Unlike others who consider that limited recoveries are "against" the utility
685

mission application of full recovery remains limited. Although full
recovery was offered to a utility in a subsequent case if it cancelled

its nuclear project," 5 the trend remains away from awarding rate
base treatment or a carrying charge on any portion of a utility's pru-

dent expenditures. The recent decisions of the North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) are representative of the retreat from
"full recovery" awards. In 1980, Virginia Electric & Power Co.
(VEPCO) decided to cancel its North Anna 4 nuclear project. The

NCUC found VEPCO's decisions prudent and, despite case precedent to the contrary," x6 granted VEPCO's request for rate base

treatment of the full unamortized balance because a different result
would penalize the shareholders for prudent management
decisions.'"
In 1981, the rate base treatment of North Anna 4 costs again
came into issue. 1 8 The NCUC considered the matter, and decided
that now only the unamortized costs associated with senior capital' 9
warranted rate base treatment. The NCUC's logic in disallowing a
return on the common equity component of these costs was that
common stockholders control VEPCO's management and should not
receive a return on investments by management in a cancelled
plant. 20 It was "fair and reasonable," however, to give senior capital
and "for" the ratepayer, the DPU believed that any loss allocation eventually falls on the
ratepayer. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 459. Second, and more significantly, the
DPU had already extensively investigated the Pilgrim II project in the DPU No. 19494
proceeding of 1981. After 18 months of considering the results of the investigation, the
DPU found that Pilgrim II was prudent. See Boston Edison Co., Mass. DPU No. 19494
(Sept. 1981). Possibly the DPU's earlier investigation of Pilgrim II provided it with the
confidence that BECO's efforts warranted full recovery. An appeal of the BECO decision
was unsuccessful. See Attorney Gen. v. Dep't of Pub. Util., 390 Mass. 208, 455 N.E.2d
414, 425 (1983).
115. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission considered the Black Fox nuclear
project to be economically unsound. Finding that management decisions to date were
prudent, it stated that any future construction expenditures would be imprudent. Additionally, it offered the utility a ten-year amortization, and a return on the debt and preferred equity portion of the unamortized balance if the utility cancelled within 30 days.
Public Service of Oklahoma, Oklahoma Corporation Commission Order No. 206560
(Jan. 15, 1982). The utility subsequently cancelled the project. For a discussion of the
history of the project and the Commission review, see generally Note, supra note 6, at
192-95.
116. In a prior proceeding, the NCUC allowed VEPCO amortization over ten
years for its cancelled Surry plant loss, but rejected rate base treatment. Rate base treatment was denied because the NCUC considered that the Surry cancellation was not "in
the best interests of VEPCO customers." See Re Virginia Elec. & Power Co,, 48 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 327, 346 (N.C. Aug. 26, 1982).
117. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., N.C.U.C. Case No. E-22, Sub 257 (July 15,
1981).
118. 48 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 346-47.
119. Presumably, the NCUC's characterization of "senior debt" or "senior capital" refers to those plant costs financed through debt or preferred equity capital, and
excludes common equity.
120. 48 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 347.

[VOL. 22: 669, 1985]

Ratemaking Theories
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

holders a return because of their limited impact on VEPCO's
decisions.121
Possibly the NCUC recognized the weakness of its justification for
allowing rate base treatment of senior capital only. In a recent proceeding on VEPCO's newly cancelled North Anna 3 plant, the
NCUC reaffirmed its original precedent of awarding no rate base
treatment, and only provided VEPCO with cost recovery through a
ten-year amortization.' 22 Furthermore, the NCUC reversed its previous North Anna 4 decision allowing rate base treatment of senior
capital costs, and removed any North Anna 4 costs from the rate
base, finally resulting in a "partial recovery."'1 2 3 The partial recovery

alternative remains the most commonly applied. In contrast, no utility has been awarded full recovery since 1982.
PartialRecovery

The second basic treatment alternative is "partial recovery,"
which24 is the most frequently awarded treatment for a cancelled plant
loss.'

The questions presented are identical to those present in full

recovery cases. However, commissions awarding only "partial recovery" reject any rate base treatment or carrying charge. Furthermore,
in partial recovery cases commissions seem more flexible in sharing
the loss between ratepayer and shareholder than in either "full" or
121.

Id.

122.

Virginia Elec. & Power Co., N.C.U.C. Case No. E-22, Sub. 273 (Dec. 5,

1983).
123. A similar sequence of events transpired between the NCUC and Carolina
Power and Light (CP&L). Shortly after its August, 1982 VEPCO decision allowing rate
base treatment on "senior" capital costs, the NCUC found CP&L prudent in its cancellation of the Shearon Harris plants. Re Carolina Power & Light Co., 49 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 188 (N.C. Sept. 24, 1982). Interestingly, the NCUC provided rate base recognition only of costs supported by long-term debt, thereby precluding CP&L from earning a return both on the preferred equity and common equity components. Id. at 217.
This action served to "fairly and equitably share the burden" between CP&L shareholders and the ratepayers. The primary justification was again that management is controlled by the shareholders, both preferred and common. Id. at 218.
However, as with VEPCO, the NCUC reexamined its award of rate base treatment on
long-term debt in a subsequent CP&L proceeding. See Re Carolina Power & Light Co.,
55 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 582 (N.C. Sept. 19, 1983). The purpose of the reexamination was to "develop a more consistent and equitable approach to [proper rate making
treatment]." Id. at 600 (emphasis added). In its reexamination, the NCUC discarded the
"management control by equity holders" justification and turned solely to fairness and
reasonableness. Because neither the shareholders nor the ratepayers should bear the full
brunt of the loss, a more equitable allocation required the removal of all unamortized
Shearon Harris costs from the rate base which resulted in a "partial recovery."
124. Of the approximately 45 decisions the author surveyed for 1982-84, about
70% awarded partial recovery.

"no" recovery treatments. Therefore, partial recovery decisions tend

to reflect more creativity in shaping rate relief.
As in full recovery cases, the commission faces the resolution of
two basic issues after prudent costs are identified: (1) should rate
base treatment, or a carrying charge, be granted and, (2) what is the
length of amortization? Unfortunately, commissions frequently omit
thorough or quantitative explanations of their decisions on these two
questions.

The most prevalent justifications for denying rate base treatment
are that the plant is not "used and useful,"'12 5 that jurisdictional precedent does not support such treatment, 126 that such treatment is unfair or inequitable to the ratepayers, 127 or that a shorter amortization
period award precludes the need for rate base treatment. 128 Additionally, utilities periodically reach settlements or stipulations which
do not provide for rate base treatment, 129 or even decide against ever
proposing such an award. 30 Despite these limited reasons for denying rate base treatment or a carrying charge, the commissions offer a
variety of opinions regarding what costs are recoverable through
amortization, and the length of that period.
For example, commissions periodically employ cut-off dates beyond which costs are imprudent and unrecoverable.' 3 ' In one case,
125. See Re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 157,
202 (Tex. Dec. 6, 1982); Re Pacific Power & Light Co., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
82, 90-91 (Or. Aug. 18, 1982); Re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 109, 115 (N.J. Jan. 13, 1983); Detroit Edison Co., Michigan P.S.C. Case No. 46949 (Mar. 31, 1983).
126. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 19 FED. ENERGY REG. COMM.(CCH) 1
61,208 (May 28, 1982), aft'd, 20 FED. ENERGY REG. Comm. (CCH) %61,083, affd sub
nom. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 730 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Re
Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 109, 115 (N.J. Jan. 13, 1983); Re
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 500, 533 (D.C. Dec. 29, 1982);
Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light, 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 158, 165 (Wash. Feb. 1, 1983).
127. See Re Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 372, 392
(Vt. Sept. 16, 1982); Re Duke Power Co., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 483, 496 (N.C.
Nov. 1, 1982); Re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 157,
202 (Tex. Dec. 6, 1982); Re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
500, 532-33 (D.C. Dec. 29, 1982); Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. Puget Sound
Power & Light Co., 54 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 480, 497 (Wash. July 22, 1983); Re
Central I11.
Light Co., 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 351, 364 (I11.
Dec. 21, 1982);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., C.P.U.C. Dec. No. 83-12-068, mimeo at 412 (Dec. 22, 1983).
128. See Re Commonwealth Elec., 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 229, 233 (Mass.
May 28, 1982); Re Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co., 52 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 197,
221 (Mass. Mar. 31, 1983).
129. See Virginia Elec. & Power Co., W. Va. P.S.C. Case No. 81-413-E-42T
(June 10, 1982); Re Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 503, 556
(Me. Apr. 8, 1982).
130. See Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., Ind. P.S.C. Case No. 36689 (Aug. 11,
1982); Re Union Elec. Co., 53 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 565, 590 (I11.
May 23, 1983).
131. See, e.g., Re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
157, 200 (Tex. Dec. 6, 1982) (the Texas Commission removed $166,000,000 from the
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the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) even "imputed" imprudence
from the lead partner in a project to a participat13 2

ing utility.

Another commission method of identifying recoverable costs is by

categorizing the different elements of the loss. The most commonly
manipulated element is AFUDC. The majority of jurisdictions con-

sider that AFUDC is an integral part of the construction costs
(CWIP); 33 if prudently incurred, the entire AFDUC component is a
recoverable cost. 3 4 However, some commissions consistently
disagree.

For example, two northeastern state commissions consider
AFUDC something less that a legitimate cost, despite its prudent

incurrance. The Massachusetts DPU disallowed the amortized recovery of the equity portion of the AFUDC in Re Commonwealth Electric Co. l3 1 This action was in accordance with the DPU's "risk sharing"
methodology,
despite
Commonwealth's
demonstrated

prudence.' 36 As previously noted, most jurisdictions do not agree

total $360,000,000 loss because the costs accrued after the date on which the project
should have been cancelled).
132. Re Commonwealth Elec. Co., 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 229 (Mass. May
28, 1982) (Commonwealth's grant of authority was so broad that "sound legal and policy
grounds" supported the imputed imprudence). Accord Re Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light
Co., 52 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 197, 220 (Mass. May 31, 1983) (similar grant led the
DPU to "conclude that the shareholders must bear the consequences of that act."). Cf.
Re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 109, 115 (N.J. Jan. 13, 1983)
(The utility requested a carrying charge on the unamortized balance because "it had no
input into the final decision to abandon the project." Noting that the lead participant,
Public Service Electric & Gas, had not received a carrying charge, the New Jersey
P.S.C. denied Atlantic City's request.).
133. See Re Central I1l. Light Co., 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 351 (Ill. Dec.
21, 1983); Carolina Power & Light, S.C.P.S.C. Order No. 83-583 (Oct. 28 1983); Duke
Power Co., N.C.U.C. Case No. E-7, Sub. 358 (Sept. 30, 1983); Re Union Illuminating,
55 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 252 (Conn. Aug. 22, 1983); Re Union Elec., 53 Pub. Util
Rep. 4th (PUR) 565 (I11.May 23, 1983); Re Detroit Edison, 52 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 318 (Mich. Mar. 31, 1983); Re Duquesne Light Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 198 (Pa. Jan. 27, 1983); Re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 157 (Tex. Dec. 6, 1982).
134. One commission stated that "[iut would be an unwarranted penalty to disallow the amortization of accumulated AFUDC ....
[T]he carrying costs on the project
[AFUDC] are as much a legitimate expense of the project as more tangible costs such as
parts and materials." Re Union Elec. Co., 53 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 565, 592 (I11.
May 23, 1983).
135. 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 229 (Mass. May 28, 1982). An identical fate
befell Fitchburg Gas & Electric. See 52 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 220-21.
136. The commission considered that recovery of equity AFUDC would remove
the inherent risk associated with common stock. 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 237.
However, the DPU's denial of equity AFUDC may have been set off by Fitchburg's and
Commonwealth's short amortization periods, three years and two years respectively. Al-

with Massachusetts' "sound"

ratemaking principles on AFUDC

treatment.
The Maine Public Utilities Commission (PUC), is even less

favorable toward AFUDC recovery. Following its precedent of disallowing all AFUDC on cancelled projects,' 3 7 the PUC rejected Bangor Hydro-Electric's request for recovery of the long-term debt com-

ponent of AFUDC because it would result in an inequitable
allocation of the loss. 138 The Maine PUC considered that sharehold-

ers assessed their risk to include the loss of any expected return on
the entire investment, both debt and equity. Unfortunately, the com-

mission provided no quantitative data to illustrate how its treatment
of AFUDC made the award more "equitable."
A commission's selection of an amortization period is also frequently left unsupported in an opinion. A commission will not generally link the length of amortization to the projected useful life of the
cancelled facility. 139 However, most commissions still omit an objective analysis supporting their selection of a period
justified on "equi'
table" considerations or its "appropriateness. 140
Occasionally, a commission does offer some good insight. In Re
Central Vermont Public Service Corp.,4" the Vermont Public Serthough Boston Edison had a ten-year amortization period, it was also awarded rate base
treatment of the unamortized amount.
137. See Central Me. Power Co., Me. P.U.C. Docket Nos. 81-121/81]-206 (Mar.
27, 1982); Central Me. Power Co., Me. P.U.C. Docket Nos. 80-25/80]-66 (Oct. 10,
1980). Accord Pacific Gas & Elec., C.P.U.C. Decision No. 83-12-068 (Dec. 22, 1983)
(the CPUC's denial of PG&E recovery of AFUDC on a variety of cancelled projects
provided a "fair and reasonable sharing").
138. Re Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 503, 557 (Me.
Apr. 8, 1982). However, a utility in extreme financial hardship may be allowed to recover some of the AFUDC. Id.
139. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Power Co., FED. ENERGY REG. COMM. (CCH) Opinion No. 211, Docket No. ER81-779-005 (Mar. 22, 1984) (the FERC rejected a thirtyyear amortization, based on the expected useful life of the plant, because of the balance
of interests between ratepayers and investors. A ten-year amortization was found to have
a minimal effect on the ratepayer's cost of service versus the utility's disadvantage of an
extended recovery period.).
140. See, e.g., Re Central I1l. Light Co., 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 351, 364
(I!1. Dec. 21, 1983) (an "equitable balancing"); Re Union Elec. Co., 53 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 565, 592 (I11.
May 23, 1983) ("the most equitable accommodation"); Re
Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co., 52 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 197, 221 (Mass. May
31, 1983) (a three-year period was "appropriate"); Re Detroit Edison, 52 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 318, 326 (Mich. Mar. 31, 1983) ("more equitable" and "appropriate to follow case precedent"); Re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 109, 115
(N.J. Jan. 13, 1983) (the "most balanced and equitable result"); Re Houston Lighting &
Power Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 157, 200 (Tex. Dec. 6, 1982) ("more fairly
assesses the burden"); Re Duke Power Co., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 483, 497
(N.C. Nov. 7, 1982) ("as to the appropriate amortization period, the Commission believes and so concludes that the five-year amortization period proposed by the Company
is appropriate."). However, a complete evaluation of the possible basis for a commission's
decision is difficult without reviewing the entire transcripts of the proceeding.
141. 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 372 (Vt. Sept. 16 1982).
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vice Board (PSB) analyzed the effects of a three-year and a ten-year
amortization. Determining that a three-year period resulted in a

eighty percent ratepayer - twenty percent shareholder split, and a
ten-year period in a fifty-five percent ratepayer - forty-five percent

shareholder split, the PSB concluded "that a ten-year amortization

with no rate base treatment is appropriate."' 4 2 In contrast, the

Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission has determined that a ten-year amortization, resulting in a seventy percent

ratepayer 1-4 3thirty percent shareholder split, is an "equitable
allocation."'
Other partial recovery cases illustrate the problems facing commissions as they consider the competing interests and the varied ap-

proaches finally selected. One major problem involves treatment of
cancelled plants where the utility operates in multiple jurisdictions.
A good example of jurisdictional disputes involved the Northern
States Power (NSP) Company's Tyrone nuclear project which affected five jurisdictions - Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota,
South Dakota, and the FERC.4 After the Wisconsin Commission
refused to grant a certificate of public convenience to NSP, the

Tyrone nuclear project was cancelled. NSP's attempt to recoup its
losses resulted in four years of regulatory proceedings and litigation

in both state and federal courts. The matter also shows how the effect of the regulatory actions of one state on ratepayers of another

state can create ill feelings between jurisdictions.' 45

Occasionally, commissions are compelled to develop other creative

"partial recovery" treatments because of policy or legal restrictions

142. Id. at 392.
143. See Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. Puget Sound Power & Light
Co., 54 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 480, 484-97 (Wash. July 22, 1983).

144. See, e.g., Massella, The Tyrone Case: A Study of Plant Cancellation Costs,
FORT., Mar. 4, 1982, at 58 (detailing the early history of the proceedings).

PUB. UTIL.

145. As stated early in the fiasco by the Minnesota P.S.C., "[n]othing in this record has persuaded the commission that it is wrong in its long-held belief that the WPSC
[Wisconsin PSC] acted in a parochial fashion, in disregard for and in derogation of the
integrated [electrical supply] system concept when it denied the need certificate for
Tyrone on solely western Wisconsin growth projections." Re Northern States Power Co.,
42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 339, 361 (Minn. Apr. 30, 1981).
Other jurisdictional influences can also develop. See, e.g., Washington Util. & Transp.
Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Lighting Co., 51 Pub. Util Rep. 4th (PUR) 158, 167
(Wash. Feb. 1, 1983) (The WUTC initially denied recovery because other jurisdictions
had previously rejected PP&L's request. Approval in Washington would constitute a
"double recovery" for PP&L. Therefore, the WUTC awarded PP&L a 2.5% return on
equity premium.).

146
on
utilitymore
recovery.
In fact, restrictions on utility recovery are becoming
commonplace.

No Recovery
The third basic cancelled plant treatment will be called the "no
recovery" alternative. Analysis of these recovery denials essentially

involves determining why the commission rejected both rate base and
cost of service (amortization) recovery. Recovery denials have been

justified by jurisdictional disputes, 147 the failure of the utility to
carry its burden of proof,148 and statutory preclusion. 149 However,
since 1981, commissions have been increasingly compelled by legislation to deny any direct rate recovery where the asset is not used and
useful. 150 For example, Dayton Power & Light Co. sought recovery
for its canceled Killen project through amortization. The Ohio Commission reaffirmed that Ohio law precluded any direct recovery, and
the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the Commission's decision. 5 '
In addition to legislative enactment, ballot measures are being
used to implement laws denying direct rate recovery on non-used and

useful assets.52 In Re Union Electric Co.,' 53 the Missouri Commission 'considered the effect of an anti-CWIP proposition on a utility's
request for "partial recovery" of cancellation costs. The Commission
found no case law to provide guidance on the scope of the proposi146. See, e.g., Re Commonwealth Elec., 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 229 (Mass.
May 28, 1982) (a "purchase power adjustment clause" employed); Public Serv. Elec. &
Gas Co., N.J.B.P.U. Case No. 8012-914 (Apr. 1, 1982) ("Energy Adjustment Clause"
employed); Re Pacific Power & Light Co., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 82, 91 (Or.
Aug. 18, 1982) (extraordinary gains offset against plant cancellation losses).
147. See Re Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 547, 556
(Ariz. May 29, 1980). However, the Arizona Commission buttressed its denial with other
justifications including (1)utility failure to carry the burden, (2) a nonrecurring loss that
would skew rate case results, (3) that planning of construction was a management function under the shareholder's control, and (4) that another state's adverse regulatory conditions were not avoided through contractual safeguards. Id.
148. See Southern Cal. Edison Co., Opinion No. 62, 8 FED. ENERGY REG. COMM.
(CCH) 1 61,198 (Aug. 22 1979). "We also agree [with the ALJ] that the evidence
presented by Edison merely consisted of vague generalizations about the problems inherent in all building projects." Id. at 61,680.
149. See, e.g., Re Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
494 (Ohio July 10, 1980) (Ohio law prevents any recovery through rates for plant not
"used and useful").
150. A survey of commission orders yields approximately five "no recovery" decisions between 1979 and 1981. Of these five decisions, only two involved statutory preclusion, both from the same jurisdiction (Ohio). In contrast, ten "no recovery" decisions
were found in the 1982-83 time period. Significantly, six of these denials were based on
statutory preclusion, all from different jurisdictions.
151. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 4 Ohio St. 2d 91,
447 N.E.2d 733 (1983).
152. Generically, these laws are called "anti-CWIP" statutes because of their dictate that only "used and useful" property be recovered in rates. By definition, CWIP
expenditures do not meet the requirement.
153. 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 169 (Mo. Oct. 21, 1983).
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tion. Expecting a court appeal to resolve tle issue, the Commission
denied cost of service recovery as a matter of law, thereby preserving
the "status quo. "154 However, the Commission left the door open for

future recovery by not reaching any questions of fact.
Maine has legislated a unique approach to the cost recovery issue.
As discussed by the state commission, Maine's law restricts the commission from issuing "any order concerning the recovery from ratepayers of all or any portion of the cost of that [cancelled] facility
until after the date last announced for the completion of the plant by
the lead participant."' 155 However, an exception is available when denial of some or all recovery will injure the utility's ability to "perform its public service or attract necessary capital on just and reasonable terms."' 56 In any event, Maine utilities still have an
opportunity to recover prudent cancellation costs under the law upon
reaching the "announced" completion date of the project.
In contrast, statutes or policies of other jurisdictions are less
favorable toward a utility's second trip to the commission requesting
a recovery. In Re PortlandGeneral Electric Co. (PGE),' 57 the Oregon Commissioner considered a $132,000,000 loss on the cancelled
Pebble Springs nuclear project. Presumably because of Oregon's
anti-CWIP statute, the Commissioner made clear the ratepayers'
freedom from liability by stating that "[t]he PGE ratepayers will not
be expected to pay one cent of the cost of writing off those
plants.' 58 In case PGE had any ideas about a subsequent recovery,
the Commissioner added, "[ifn the future PGE will not seek any
further rate increases, or any compensation for the Pebble project in
any proceeding before this agency."' 159 This policy is obviously harsh
where a utility has prudently incurred these costs. However, consistent application of clear policies at least provides investors with some
ability to prospectively assess their risk.
Unfortunately, some commissions only increase risk and uncertainty by twisting words, misapplying principles, or misinterpreting
statutes. Whether these actions are conscious or unconscious, the investor's perception of increased risk will adversely influence a util154. Id. at 172.
155. Re Central Me. Power Co., 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 488, 507 (Me.
Dec. 15, 1983). This decision also provides a good example of the commission's actual
application of the law.
156. Id.
157. 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 274 (Or. Sept. 23, 1982).
158. Id. at 274.
159. Id. at 277.

ity's capital costs. A representative case is Re Pacific Power & Light

(PP&L), 160 in which the Montana Commission considered PP&L's
losses on the cancelled Pebble Springs and Washington Public Power

Supply Systems (WPPSS) nuclear projects. PP&L requested rate
recovery over five years with a return on its investment. 16 ' In opposition, the Commission staff recommended the denial of some costs
and a longer amortization period. However, the Commission exer-

cised its independence and characterized the issue in the broader
context of "who should pay." Liberally interpreting the statutory

language162 to limit any rate recovery to used and useful property
only, the Commission denied PP&L's request.
An analysis of the opinion reveals questionable 6haracterizations
of recovery theories by both the utility and the Commission. For example, the decision suggests that PP&L attempted to clear the statutory used and useful hurdle by distinguishing rate base treatment
from a carrying charge on the unamortized balance. Practically,
there is only a technical difference and the Commission properly
characterized PP&L's distinction as "one of semantics only."' 6 3
However, the balance of the opinion stands as a model for tortured
ratemaking by a commission. Essentially, the Commission's decision
64
creates much uncertainty because of its questionable analysis.
160. 53 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 24 (Mont. Apr. 18, 1983).
161. PP&L proposed an 11.2% carrying charge on the unamortized balance.
162. Montana law provided that "[t]he commission may, in its discretion, investigate and ascertain the value of the property of every public utility actually used and
useful." 53 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 27.
163. Id. at 28.
164. First, when it characterized the broader issue as "who should pay," the Commission implied a context in which an asset was not used and useful "due to misjudgment
by the Company's management." Id. at 27. This implication leads one to believe that the
Commission's real basis for ruling against PP&L was the utility's imprudence, despite
the Commission's statement that the prudency issue was never reached.
Second, the Commission's interpretation that the statute applied the used and useful
standard to evaluate any recovery appears erroneous. The statutory language provided in
the opinion more accurately refers to rate base valuation, as asserted by PP&L and as
inferred from the staff's recovery proposal. See supra note 162. If other statutory language more clearly denies all recovery, irrespective of prudence, then the Commission
should have presented it in the opinion.
Third, the Commission asserted that the statute put the investor on notice of the "used
and useful" requirement. Arguably, the Commission's interpretation and application of a
statute is what gives notice to an investor. Previously, the Montana Commission allowed
recovery but changed its mind in. this case because of its "thorough and intensive examination of the used and useful principle and the rationale behind it." 53 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) at 30.
Fourth, the Commission's analysis of PP&L's claim that the Commission's actions
constituted an unconstitutional taking of property was also weak. Ignoring PP&L's obligation to serve, the Commission said a taking had not occurred because PP&L retained
"full control and use of the projects unrestrained by either the commission or the ratepayers." Id. at 31. Certainly, PP&L had control, but it had no rate relief.
Then, as if to absolve any of its indiscretions, the Commission held as its final finding
of fact that the application of the used and useful standard would be appropriate as a

[VOL. 22: 669. 1985]

Ratemaking Theories
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Unfortunately for PP&L, it had a similar experience before the

Wyoming Commission 6 5 on the issue of cost recovery for the Pebble
Springs and WPPSS nuclear projects. Denied any recovery, based on

an interpretation of Wyoming statutes, PP&L appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court which subsequently affirmed the Commission's
order.16 The strained characterizations in the opinion demonstrate

'that courts, as well as commissions, can misapply ratemaking principles. 167 The denial of cost recovery for a utility on a weak rationale
has serious implications.
In summary, requests for cancelled plant recovery have resulted in
a variety of ratemaking treatments. The majority of jurisdictions will
matter of policy, even if not statutorily required. Cf. Pacific Power & Light, C.P.U.C.
Decision No. 82-07-048 (Dec. 2, 1983) (the C.P.U.C. considered that that the denial of
an amortized cost recovery was inappropriate where based on the used and useful standard). Essentially, the Commission's questionable analysis leads to a questionable result.
165. Pacific Power & Light, Wyo. P.S.C. Docket No. 9454, Sub 17 (Oct. 8, 1982).
This P.S.C. ruling was made in an open session, so a written order has not yet been
prepared.
166. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wyo., 677 P.2d 799
(Wyo.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 120 (1984).
167. See generally id. at 799. The Wyoming Commission interpreted a statute remarkably similar to Montana's authorizing it to "investigate, consider and determine
such matters as the cost or value, or both, of the property and business of any public
utility, used and useful for the convenience of the public." Id. at 804. After reasonably
supporting the Commission's interpretation that the statute precluded rate base treatment, the court discussed reasons for denying amortization of the loss, i.e., cost of service
recovery. Using a confusing analysis, the court determined that the expenditures "were
not 'operating expenses' as that term is generally considered." Id. at 806. This determination is contrary to the majority of jurisdictions as evidenced by the allowance of "partial recovery" in most areas.
As if it recognized the weakness of its preceding arguments, the court attempted to
bolster its position through a discussion of the balancing of risk between shareholder and
ratepayer. The court proposed that if the ratepayers were to assume any of the risk of a
utility investment, then the commission should approve the project. Although the suggestion seems reasonable, Wyoming has no statute or rule requiring prior approval. The
inconsistency of the court's new requirement was evident in its response to PP&L's arguments that the Commission had allowed the costs of other "unapproved" abandoned
projects to be recovered through rates. The court stated, "[ujsually the activity which
subsequently failed was approved as an activity prior to its inception by the PSC." Id. at
808 (emphasis added).
As noted in the discussion of the Montana Proceeding, this type of free-wheeling
ratemaking increases the riskiness of utility investments and is detrimental to the ratepayers in the long run because of increased utility costs of capital. Cf. Wisconsin Pub.
Ser. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 109 Wis. 2d 256, 325 N.W.2d 867 (1982),
where the Supreme Court- of Wisconsin reversed a P.S.C. order which retroactively amortized $7,500,000 of expenditures on a cancelled plant. The technical effect of the retroactive amortization was to prevent these costs from being considered in the ratemaking
test year. Because of ratemaking procedures, the practical effect was to preclude the
recovery of these prudent costs from the ratepayers. The court found the Commission's
decision of retroactive amortization to be arbitrary and capricious. Id.

allow cost recovery over approximately ten years, although the
length of the amortization period tends to increase with the size of
the loss. Full recovery, with its return on investment component, is
practically extinct. In fact, an increasing number of state commissions are denying all direct cost recovery as a matter of law or policy. Nevertheless, the cancelled plant dilemma will persist into the
immediate future,'68 and the strains on the regulatory agencies, legislatures, and courts must improve their application and explanation
of ratemaking treatments.
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Ratemaking is significant because all levels of economic growth
are heavily dependent on stable, adequate electric energy supplies.
Despite the current excess of electric generation capacity, some industry observers predict huge increases in electrical power demand
within ten years. 169 Presently, only large base-load generation facilities will be able to meet this demand. Although playing a key role in
ensuring that utilities remain focused on the needs of their customers, commissions must also provide utilities with the opportunity to
earn adequate revenues or to access the capital markets to support
future construction programs. Presently, many cancelled plant decisions create uncertainty and, therefore, perform a disservice to the
policy of balancing investor and ratepayer interests. For example, jurisdictions that unequivocally require a plant to be used and useful
before any rate relief is awarded are holding shareholders strictly
liable. In the present risky business environment, many utilities may
defer the construction of new capacity until it is too late to avoid
power shortages. Therefore, although the commissions are not the
only solution to the problem, they are a large part of it. What can
they do?
Based on a review of recent cancelled plant orders, it appears that
regulatory commissions can improve the quality of their decisions by
168. See Zitser, The Nuclear Plant Problem Needs a Federal Solution, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Mar. 29, 1984, at 22. Additionally, other utilities besides Consumer Power

Co. are in financial trouble with potential plant cancellations. See supra note 3. See also
L.A. Times, May 13, 1984, part V, at 8, col. I (Long Island Lighting Co. is in serious
financial trouble); The Energy Daily, Apr. 17, 1984, at 1, col. 3 (Public Service of New
Hampshire faces bankruptcy); Electric Rate Increase Requested, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June
21, 1984, at 57, 60 (Public Service of Indiana requires rate relief because of financial
problems with Marble Hill project).
169. One industry consultant stated,
"Demand for electricity will grow at a 4 to 5 percent annual rate for the rest of
this decade ....
The implications for the power supply sector are significant,
with new plant and equipment commitments of 450-700 gigawatts [hundreds of
billions of watts], or $1.5 - $2 trillion, required over the next ten years."
The Energy Daily, Apr. 12, 1984, at 2, col. 2. But see The Energy Daily, Sept. 17, 1984,
at 3, col. I (disputing predictions of electric power shortages in the 1990's).
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clearly analyzing and properly applying rate-making principles. This
effort will improve the ratepayers' and investors' understanding of

the rationale underlying a commission's decision. Ratepayers will not
be misled by rhetoric, and investors can more accurately assess the

investment risk presented. Optimally, a utility's cost of capital will
then reflect the actual risk factor, so that commissions may take
more effective ratemaking actions in the future. The following observations and recommendations are offered:
1. The existing standards of review are still viable, if applied in a
straightforward fashion.
a. Prudent costs should be recoverable. The prudency of an action is reasonably determinable, and procedures exist for review of a
commission's finding on this issue. Simultaneously, "prudency" allows flexible decision-making without compromising the integrity of
the standard. 10 In contrast, many commissions currently pare away
at prudent costs using "equitable" considerations.' Such actions
weaken the integrity of the "prudence" standard. 72 The resulting
uncertainty may raise capital costs, which the ratepayer ultimately
pays.
b. The used and useful standard should be applied consistently.
Some commissions consider that the capital itself invested in an unfinished plant is "used and useful." Others consider that only when
the plant enters commercial operation is it "used and useful."
Whichever approach is selected, it should be applied consistently.
Otherwise, uncertainty increases.
2. The used and useful standard should be restricted to rate base
determinations.
a. Holding all prudent utility expenses to the used and useful
standard creates an unreasonably high risk. An investor should be
reasonably liable, not absolutely liable. The long-term balance of interests is not properly served by the application of this standard, despite its political attractiveness in the short term.
b. However, if a jurisdiction decides to statutorily apply the
used and useful standard to all utility expenditures, then it should
170. Nevertheless, the standard must be carefully applied. See Prudence: The
Concept that Could Cost Utilities Billions, The Energy Daily, June 7, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
171. See, e.g., Re Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 503
(Me. Apr. 8, 1982) (prudently incurred "equity AFUDC" disallowed based on equitable
considerations).
172. The standard is weakened because an investor can no longer depend on the
commission allowing recovery of "prudent" costs. Therefore, whether a cost is prudently
incurred becomes inconsequential.

also provide an exception for emergency rate relief.173 An exception
provides the commission with some discretion, albeit more restricted.
Appropriate exceptions could be based on the utility's financial integrity and ability to access the capital markets. Allowing a commission to grant cost of service rate relief on these exceptions is preferable to the following ratemaking alternatives. First, the commission
can deny any rate relief under the statute, despite the utility's
prudency. The utility could go bankrupt. Second, the commission
can increase the utility's rate of return. This alternative is poor because of the public perception it creates. When a rate-payer hears of
a utility rate of return of twenty-five percent, it sounds like "profit."
In fact, there may be little or no income present because the return
premium is covering disallowed expenses. The third alternative is
equally unattractive. The commission can find an asset is used and
useful, when it actually is not. Again, inconsistency and uncertainty
enter the picture as the commission tries to unreasonably manipulate
ratemaking principles.
3. Commissions and courts should be consistent in applying procedural requirements. To deny a utility any recovery because it failed
to receive a commission's construction authorization, where none is
required, is arbitrary and capricious.174 Policies and procedure
should be clarified early in the process when compliance is achievable, not after the fact. This approach enhances the balancing of the
interests involved with plant construction.
4. Utilities should make an extra effort to communicate their plans
to their respective commissions, irrespective of the requirement to do
so. This communication presents the issues, and may reveal possible
disagreements early in the process. 175 Additionally, commission review of utility actions may improve
the chances of a utility's conduct
76
being considered "prudent."'
5. Commission and court decisions should be models of clarity and
thorough analysis.

173. Cf. Re Central Me. Power Co., 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 488 (Me. Dec.
15, 1983) (exception provided where a utility shows it cannot adequately access capital
markets without rate relief).
174. See, e.g., Re Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wyo., 677
P.2d at 799 (Wyo. 1984) (the court considered that the utility should have received
commission approval for the project despite the absence of a procedural requirement to

do so).

175. Cf. Re Central Me. Power Co., 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 488, 492 (Me.
Dec. 15, 1983) (commission considered that the utility's construction program was based
on "inaccurately high demand figures, inaccurately low cost figures, and inaccurately
optimistic completion dates").
176. Cf. Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep.'4th (PUR) 431 (Mass. Apr. 30,
1982) (extensive previous investigation of utility's construction project supported a finding of "prudent" conduct). See supra note 114.
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a.

As discussed previously, ratemaking principles should be con-

sistently applied.

b.

Poorly explained decisions provide an opportunity for ques-

tionable analysis and increased uncertainty. For example, "equitable

sharing" is a broad concept. It should be quantitatively explained, 7
not just thrown into the financial markets for interpretation. The in-

vestors and ratemakers should see why a commission considers that
an "X" percent rate increase is equitable, or why a ten-year amortization is a fair balance, or why a seventy percent to thirty percent
shareholder-ratepayer sharing is appropriate. 178 This type of express
quantitative analysis presented in the commission decision, not just
buried in the hearing transcripts, 179 provides real notice to the
public.
c.
Strained characterizations undermine ratemaking principles
and exacerbate decision-making problems in future proceedings. Denying the equity element of AFUDC because "shareholders have
control of management,"' 80 or because that element of the cost of
construction capital is not really a cost of service"" isa weak justification. Rather than manipulating prudently incurred AFUDC to
balance the loss between investor and ratepayer, the commission
could amortize the loss over a longer period. Similarly, the commission should not strain to characterize an expenditure as "not being
an operating expense," when the definition provided suggests that it
really is a proper expense. 8 2

177. See, e.g., Re Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 386
(N.Y. Jan. 13, 1982) (opinion provides an excellent quantitative comparison of the effects of different amortization periods, and why the NYPSC considered its selection
"equitable").
178. Cf. DeWitt Truck Brokers v. Flemming Fruit, 540 F.2d 681, 685 (4th Cir.
1976), yhere the court discussing the basis for piercing the corporate veil, stated, "[o]ne
court has suggested that courts should abjure 'the mere incantation of the term "instrumentality"' in this context and, since the issue is one of fact, should take pains to spell
out the specific factual basis for its conclusion."
179. Cf. Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 434 (Mass.
Apr. 30, 1982) (selection of amortization period based on "evidence in the record").
180. See, e.g., Re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 48 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 327,
346-47 (N.C. Aug. 26, 1982) (return on common equity component of AFUDC denied
because stockholders control management).
181. Cf. Re Commonwealth Elec., 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 229, 237 (Mass.
May 28, 1982) (equity AFUDC is a risk premium for common shareholders, and not a
reflection of the cost of construction monies).
182. See, e.g., Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wyo., 677
P.2d 799 (Wyo. 1984) (court considered PP&L's expenditures on new plant were not an
"expense contributing to the ... greater efficiency of the utility").

CONCLUSION

The cancelled plant dilemma has strained the ratemaking principles employed by various jurisdictions. However, a review of applicable decisions indicates that these principles are still useful, and can
remain so if properly applied. The problem of balancing the interests
of ratepayers and investors is not one prone to simplistic generalizations, especially in a complex operating environment and where the
impact is so significant. The issue has been characterized as "who
should pay?"'u 3 The practical problem is better illustrated by the
question "who wants to pay," and the answer, "no one!" Yet, someone must pay, and it is generally the commissions' decision.
The jurisdictions have extensive authority to accomplish this task.
The U.S. Supreme Court has implied that these powers remain
strong and the scope of available courses of action broad.18 4 It appears that so long as the final result is reasonable, the regulators will
not have exceeded their limits. 85 Nevertheless, the commissions still
have a strong responsibility to the ratepayers and investors. Similarly, both the legislature in delimiting the commission's powers and
the judiciary in reviewing the commission's exercise of those powers
have a responsibility to ensure fair ratemaking treatment.
The regulatory commissions and ratemaking principles remain
only one part of the broader solution to the cancelled plant problem
and this country's energy future. But they are one very important
part!
PHILLIP L. POIRIER, JR.

183. See Pacific Power & Light, 53 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 24, 26 (Mont. Apr.
18, 1983).
184. See,-e.g., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Consumer's Counsel, 455 U.S.
914 (1982). The Court dismissed CEI's appeal for lack of a "properly presented federal
question" in a memorandum opinion. The implication was that the state could enact laws
denying rates on non-used and useful property without violating the Constitution.
185. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944)
(it is the "end result" that determines the reasonableness of the decision, not the process
by which the decision is reached).
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